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Choice Architecture for Healthier Insurance Choices: Ordering and 
Partitioning Can Improve Decisions 
 
 
Abstract 
Health insurance decisions are a challenge for many consumers and influence welfare, health 
outcomes, and longevity.  Two choice architecture tools are examined that can improve these 
decisions: informed ordering of options (from best to worst) and choice set partitioning.  It is 
hypothesized that these tools can improve choices by changing: (1) decision focus: the options in 
a set on which consumers focus their attention, and (2) decision strategy: how consumers 
integrate the different attributes that make up the options.  The first experiment focuses on the 
mediating role of the hypothesized decision processes on consumer decision outcomes.  The 
outcome results are validated further in a field study of over 40,000 consumers making actual 
health insurance choices and in two additional experiments.  The results show that informed 
ordering and partitioning can reduce consumers’ mistakes by hundreds of dollars per year.  They 
suggest that wise choice architecture interventions depend upon two factors:  The quality of the 
user model possessed by the firm to predict consumers’ best choice and possible interactions 
among the ensemble of choice architecture tools. 
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Choice architecture is a potentially powerful way for firms to affect the market behavior 
of consumers.  In this paper, we illustrate these effects in a personally and societally important 
choice, the selection of health insurance coverage.  There is evidence that access to health 
insurance increases longevity (Woolhandler and Himmelstein 2017).  Health insurance decisions 
are important for consumers because they determine access to potentially lifesaving health care 
and have important financial consequences.  They are important for society because health care 
coverage is an important contributor to firms’ costs and to social justice.  Finally, as we shall see, 
what seem to be minor changes in choice architecture can have a large effect on health insurance 
product market share and consumer welfare. 
Ideally, choice architecture can be used to direct consumers’ choices toward better 
outcomes (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).  For example, defaults can be used to facilitate the choice 
of a good alternative without requiring an extensive contemplation (Johnson and Goldstein 
2003).  Much research to date has focused on describing the impact of different separate choice 
architecture tools on consumer choices outcomes (Cadario and Chandon 2018; Johnson et al. 
2012; Lamberton and Diehl 2013; Szaszi et al. 2018). 
Our goals in this paper are two-fold.  Our first goal is to contribute to the understanding 
of choice architecture.  We do this in two ways: One is by exploring the process by which choice 
architecture changes consumer decision outcomes.  We specifically propose and test two types of 
choice architecture–induced changes in consumer decision processes that affect consumer 
decision outcomes.  The second way is by demonstrating that the quality of the firm’s prediction 
of what is the best choice, what we will call a user model, is an essential component of designing 
choice architecture. 
Our second goal is to demonstrate how a new combination of choice architecture 
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interventions can improve health insurance choices.  Health insurance choices are highly 
complex:  People often do not understand the basic terms, such as deductibles, used to describe 
insurance (Loewenstein et al. 2013; Ubel, Comerford, and Johnson 2015), and make mistakes 
that result in substantial overpayment for coverage (Johnson et al. 2013).  A recent examination 
of the choices of a large firm showed that the majority of decision-makers picked options that 
were dominated, and employees paid 42% more ($373 annually) than needed for equivalent 
coverage (Bhargava, Loewenstein, and Sydnor 2017), essentially wasting a large part of their 
payments.  Improving these choices could both make the allocation of health care resources more 
efficient for society and improve health outcomes for individuals. 
At first blush, improving choices seems close to the idea that marketing should fulfill 
consumer needs.  However, good choice architecture could also lead to the sale of less profitable 
products.  This may be incongruent with the idea that marketing actions should increase profits 
or shareholder value.  Yet, with the rapid advances in large-scale data availability and digital 
technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, there may be a new reality: 
Marketers are often be able to predict with great accuracy which products best match a given 
consumer’s needs (Chintagunta, Hanssens, and Hauser 2016) and perhaps they may know better, 
or as least as well, as a consumer.  Therefore, new data-analytics driven services could 
potentially be designed that use choice architecture to increase the probability consumers will 
choose the product that is best for them, and at the same time may provide new business 
opportunities for firms.  Domains such as health, consumer finance, and education, are especially 
promising for such interventions, because they involve high-impact consumer decisions, where 
the complexity of the decision makes it difficult for consumers to select the best available option 
by themselves.  We return to how this may affect firm market shares and consumer welfare, in 
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the short and long term at the end of this paper. 
Choice Architecture Processes: Decision Focus and Decision Strategy 
 
To intelligently choose and implement choice architecture interventions, marketers need 
to understand how the intervention affects consumers’ decision making.  There has been 
significant research examining the way that preselecting options, or default effects work (Carroll 
et al. 2009; Dinner et al. 2011; Jachimowicz et al. 2017).  The robustness of default effects may 
be due to multiple causes, including the ease of selecting the default, the implied endorsement of 
the default, and the fact that the default option might be seen as an endowed option (Brown and 
Krishna 2004).  However, there are many other elements of choice architecture, such as ordering, 
partitioning, deciding the size of a choice set, and the labeling of attributes that have seen less 
exploration of the mechanisms that determine their effectiveness. 
We concentrate on two decision process mechanisms that apply across several different 
interventions but seem particularly relevant to the choice architecture interventions we examine: 
partitioning the choice set and ordering the choice set by predicted quality.  The first mechanism 
is that choice architecture can change the options examined by consumers.  Decision-makers 
allocate attention differentially across options, and choice architecture can change this allocation 
to shift attention towards the highest quality options. We term this mechanism decision focus.  
Imagine, for example, that a consumer inspects only the first five options, even when the total set 
of products is much larger.  If the choice architect changes the order presented to the consumer, 
this will change the alternatives the consumer considers and, perhaps, the alternative chosen.  
The second mechanism is that choice architecture can change the way consumers process the 
attributes that describe the options.  We term this consumers’ decision strategy.  One well-known 
 
 
6 
 
taxonomy used to describe strategies differentiates between compensatory and non-
compensatory heuristics (Gilbride and Allenby 2004; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993).  
Roughly speaking, compensatory strategies are more effortful, and make tradeoffs between 
attributes, while non-compensatory strategies are simpler, because they do not directly make 
tradeoffs.  Although there are cases where non-compensatory strategies produce good choices, 
non-compensatory strategies can perform badly if here is a negative correlation between the 
attributes of the options (Bettman et al. 1993).  This occurs frequently, for example because of 
physical and financial constraints.  Insurance policies with low premiums must have higher 
deductibles to be viable, and gasoline vehicles with great acceleration tend to have worse fuel 
economy.  More generally, markets in which all products are on the efficient frontier will be 
constrained to have some negatively correlated attributes (Johnson and Payne, 1985).  As a 
result, choice architecture that encourages non-compensatory strategies can, in some cases, 
produce worse choices.  To discuss how these two decision processes may be influenced by 
choice architecture, we turn to our two common interventions, often used in practice, but that 
have received less academic attention, partitioning and ordering.   
 
Partitioning Effects on Decision Focus and Strategy 
Partitioning (Cheema and Soman 2008; Dorn, Messner, and Wänke 2016; Johnson et al. 
2012) separates a choice set into two or more sets that can be inspected sequentially.  Many web 
sites present a “soft” partitioning that allows consumers to easily click through from a first, 
smaller selection to the another, larger selection of options.  For example, an airline site might 
first present a small subset of all possible flights.  Doing this draws decision makers’ attention to 
the initially presented products (which we call the primary set), but at the same time allows them 
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the option to click through to see the remainder of the set (i.e., the full set).  Through 
partitioning, the initial inspection for the first presented set of alternatives is less costly (in terms 
of effort) to the consumer than inspection of the full set (which requires one or more additional 
information requests, such as a mouse click). 
Normatively, given that the additional costs (one mouse click) of accessing the full set 
are negligible, inspection of the full set might have a positive return for the consumer and, 
therefore, consumers should typically continue to inspect this set after inspecting the primary set.  
In contrast, we predict that decision makers are myopic and that the perceptually more 
prominent, higher cost of having to click through to the next screen will dominate the potential 
returns to search in consumers’ decisions to inspect the full set or not (Häubl, Dellaert, and 
Donkers 2010; Hogarth and Einhorn 1992; Wilson et al. 2000).  This suggests that partitioning 
will increase consumers’ focus on the smaller restricted set of alternatives.   
Evidence also suggests that this reduction may affect the consumer’s decision strategy.  
Typically, when faced with a large choice set, consumers make first make a less detailed 
evaluation of the larger set of alternatives followed by a more in-depth comparison takes for a 
small subset of products (Chakravarti, Janiszewski, and Ülkümen 2006; Payne 1976).  While 
compensatory strategies may not be cognitively feasible in a making a decision for the full set 
(Besedeš et al. 2015; Chernev, Böckenholt, and Goodman 2015; Dellaert and Häubl 2012; 
Hanoch et al. 2011), presenting a smaller primary set will increase the probability of consumers 
using a compensatory decision strategy, promoting tradeoffs between different attributes 
(Johnson and Meyer 1984; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993).  In contrast, when choice sets 
are large, heuristics such as screening will cause consumers to focus on one attribute, which 
increases its weight and lowers decision quality. 
 
 
8 
 
 
Ordering Effects on Decision Focus and Strategy 
The second intervention we examine involves ordering the options.  If options presented 
early in a choice set have an advantage in being chosen, then populating these positions with 
alternatives most likely to be good for the consumer may improve choice.  The basic idea is that 
order effects should be used to the consumers’ advantage. 
There is a large and complex literature that examines the effect of option order which has 
a complex set of results.  In some studies, people demonstrate edge avoidance and concentrate on 
options occupying the center of the visual field (Atalay, Bodur, and Rasolofoarison 2012), but in 
many other studies there seems to be an advantage of being first, with some usually smaller 
advantage of being last (Bar-Hillel 2015).  One way of reconciling this discrepancy is to suggest 
that it is not order, per se, that produces order effects, but rather attention is the key factor in 
mediating the advantage of order.  For example, Atalay et al. (2012) find that attention mediates 
the effect of order and other studies which control order by serial presentation of stimuli show 
strong advantages of being first (Mantonakis, et al.  2009; Russo, Carlson, and Meloy, 2006).  
Other applications that show strong advantages of choices from ordered lists include an increase 
in the downloads of working papers by economists (Feenberg et al. 2017) and the vote share of 
political candidates (Koppell and Steen 2004; Miller and Krosnick 1998), although in the case of 
voting there are moderating variables (Ho and Imai 2008).  Our concept of decision focus 
captures the idea that increased attention can lead to significant advantages in choice.  We argue, 
therefore that for a list of options (as opposed to a matrix that features pictorial information), the 
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first options will receive increased attention.1 
In contrast to the effect of focus, the effect of ordered lists on decision strategy is less 
clear.  Because ordering does not change the number and type of the options that are in the 
choice set, and may even increase the complexity of comparing between options by bringing 
more similar options closer together, we may not see a shift to compensatory strategies.  In 
addition, there is evidence that in some settings the effects of ordering by attractiveness is not 
helpful to consumers (Diehl 2005).  In this case, ironically, consumers search , too much.  This 
over-search can lead to worse choice outcomes, because it is more challenging for consumers to 
select the best option from a larger set of options, which makes it more likely they choose a less 
attractive one.  In sum, we hypothesize that order could increase focus on desirable options, but 
suspect that effects on strategy may be negligible or even negative. 
 
User Models and Choice Architecture 
The effectiveness of both partitioning and ordering depends strongly on how well the 
choice architect can predict what is the best choice for the consumer.  But given its importance, it 
is surprising that the quality of this understanding, which we refer to as a user model, has not 
received more explicit attention.  For example, if the designer is naïve about what people need, 
the subset provided by the partition might not contain better options, and the ordering could be 
unrelated to choice quality.  The accuracy of a user model will determine whether ordering is 
helpful, has no effect, or even is potentially harmful. 
                                                 
1 We distinguish this from applications that sort options by a single attribute.  Every choice set has an 
order, even if it is random.  Contrast this to applications that sort by price or quality (Lynch and Ariely 
2000; Suk, Lee, and Lichtenstein 2012).  That literature shows that sorting on an attribute increases the 
importance of the attribute and leads individuals to eliminate based on that attribute.  Sorting by predicted 
quality, should increase, via reading order, of the choice of the first options. 
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User models can differ in quality for at least two reasons: First, the marketer may not 
know what is best for, or desired by, consumers.  Some user models’ predictions are relatively 
accurate and uncontroversial.  For example, most people undersave for retirement, would like to 
save more, and usually endorse the use of choice architecture tools such as defaults to increase 
their savings (Madrian et al. 2017; Thaler and Benartzi 2004).  Similarly, many individuals are 
not very physically active, would like to exercise more, and support the use of choice 
architecture to promote going to the gym more often (Milkman, Milson, and Volpp 2013).  The 
second reason why the user model might be inaccurate for any individual consumer is that 
consumers needs and tastes might differ, and the firm may be unable to predict those differences.  
Unobservable heterogeneity across consumers represent a challenge to choice architecture. 
The quality of the user model will moderate the impact of most if not all choice 
architecture interventions.  User models can differ on several dimensions: They may be based on 
normative models, use simple notions like ranking by market share, or use complex 
recommender systems.  But in all cases, user model quality is essential to implementing choice 
architecture in the consumer’s best interest.  Defaults, for example, presume that the firm knows 
what is in the best interest of customers. 
What should be done when user models are inaccurate?  In these cases, strong choice 
architecture might not improve the quality of choice or can even lead to a decrease in decision 
quality.  When user model quality is low, a choice architecture that supports greater consumer 
autonomy could be more beneficial for consumers.  Variability in the quality of user models 
raises, therefore, an important question for choice architects:  How to facilitate and improve 
consumer choice while preserving consumer autonomy? 
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Hypotheses 
In sum, we propose two choice architecture tools that can, in principle, improve choice: 
(1) partitioning large sets into two sets: a primary set of only a small number of alternatives and a 
secondary set consisting of all the other alternatives, and (2) ordering options by a user model.  
We argue that both of these interventions affect the decision focus of choosers and that 
partitioning can affect consumer’s strategies in a positive manner.  Finally, the quality of the user 
model will determine if partitioning and ordering might help or hurt choice. 
Both partitioning and ordering are relatively “soft” interventions:  They do not remove 
options from the choice set or marketplace, but we hypothesize that these (soft) restriction 
improves consumer choice outcomes because they encourage consumers' decision focus to better 
alternatives and change consumer strategies by encouraging a more compensatory decision 
strategy that takes into account more of the relevant attributes.  
Given that partitioning, ordering, and user models may individually and together affect 
choice outcomes, we now turn to develop a set of hypotheses that capture these effects.  Our 
contribution is to show that both partitioning and ordering can aid choices, but only in the 
presence of an accurate user model.  Further, we show that these effects are due to shifts in 
decision focus and strategy, even when the choice architecture interventions involve relatively 
small and normatively irrelevant changes in the display. 
H1:  Partitioning affects decision strategy.  Because partitioning reduces the number of 
immediately visible options, we expect a shift to compensatory strategies. 
H2:  Informed ordering affects decision focus.  The effects of ordering suggest that the 
best options will receive more attention when an ordering benefits from a more accurate user 
model.  We term an ordering that uses a more accurate user model an informed ordering and 
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predict that, compared to a naïve (i.e., more random) ordering, it will increase decision focus 
because the best options are presented at the top of the list.  However, because the number of 
options remain unchanged and ordering promotes greater closeness of attractiveness we expect 
little change in strategy. 
H3:  Partitioning affects decision focus, but only with informed ordering.  Although the 
remainder of options are only one click away and can contain the most favorable options, we 
expect partitioning to cause individuals to focus attention on the smaller recommended set.  This 
focus contrasts with an analysis that suggests that search would be driven by the attractiveness of 
the yet-to-be-inspected options.  The relatively small additional cost will loom large in 
allocations of attention. When ordering is informed (i.e., based on a high-quality user model), 
this smaller recommended set supports decision focus on the best options.  However, when 
ordering is naïve, consumer attention will be focused on a random set of options, and decision 
focus on the best options is likely to deteriorate. 
H4:  Partitioning improves choice with informed ordering but worsens choice with naïve 
ordering.  Because the smaller set in the partitioning is more likely to contain the better options, 
the combination of an informed ordering with partitioning will improve choice.  This 
improvement is stronger than the sum of the separate impact that partitioning and ordering can 
produce.  In other words, partitioning and informed ordering interact to produce an even greater 
improvement in choice.  In contrast, partitioning combined with a naïve ordering can be harmful 
to consumer choice.  In our experiments, the naïve ordering is close to random, but we would 
expect a greater decrease in choice quality if the user model generated a perverse ordering 
whereby order was negatively correlated with what is best for consumers. 
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H5:  Changes in decision strategy and focus mediate this improvement.  More precisely, 
we predict that consumer choice outcomes will change due to shifts in the two consumer 
decision processes and that these decision processes, in turn, are impacted by the choice 
architecture interventions that are introduced.  These effects represent a parallel mediation 
process, as visualized in Figure 1.  Thus, we hypothesize, first, that consumers’ use of 
compensatory decision strategies mediates the effect of partitioning on consumer decision 
outcomes, and second, that consumers’ focus on the best alternatives mediates the impact of an 
informed ordering on consumer decision outcomes.  Third, we also predict that the informed 
ordering will moderate the effect of partitioning on consumer decision outcomes and that this 
improvement will be mediated by consumers’ focus on the best alternatives (mediated 
moderation).  Figure 1 represents our hypotheses. 
 
-  INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE – 
 
Study 1: Consumer Health Insurance Choice with Ordered and Partitioned 
Sets 
 
In Study 1, we investigated the hypothesized effects of ordering and partitioning on 
consumers’ choice outcomes and decision processes.  We constructed a choice task modeled on a 
typical consumer decision task on health insurance exchange websites that allow consumers to 
purchase health insurance plans.  The website was similar in many ways to HealthCare.gov and 
the other health insurance exchange websites established under the Affordable Care Act in the 
United States (Wong et al. 2016).  We manipulated two components: (1) the quality of the user 
model, based on which products were ordered in the set (low quality model for a naïve ordering 
 
 
14 
 
versus a high quality model for an informed ordering), and (2) the absence or presence of 
partitioning in the ordered set.  Note that the quality of the user model was reflected in the 
quality of the ordering. These two aspects work closely in tandem: user model quality is 
presented to consumers through ordering.   
The participants were given a defined goal representing the utility of another person and 
asked to follow this clearly defined decision rule.  The rule stated that their objective was to 
minimize total expected costs given the person’s health care needs usage and the three provided 
attributes.  This eliminated unobserved preference heterogeneity between participants allowing 
us to objectively define the quality of the decision that each participant made.  We also 
investigated how consumers’ decision processes change based on ordering, partitioning, and 
their interaction.  To do so, we used a MouselabWEB interface that allowed us to directly 
observe which product attribute levels participants inspected during their decision process, and in 
which order (see www.mouselabweb.org).  This technique has been shown to be useful in the 
study of individual choice, as well as games and time preferences (Costa-Gomes and Crawford 
2006; Gabaix et al. 2006; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993; Willemsen and Johnson 2011). 
 
Method 
This study was a framed-field experiment (Harrison and List 2004) where actual 
decision-makers made decisions with realistic stimuli.  To increase the stakes, participants 
received a monetary reward based on their performance in the task.  More specifically, they 
received $2 for participating and could earn an additional bonus of up to $6 dollars depending on 
how well their choices matched the assigned goals.  Participants were randomly assigned to one 
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of four treatment conditions, based on a 2 (ordering: informed vs. naïve) by 2 (partitioning: yes 
vs. no) between-subjects experimental design.  All conditions presented the same eight health 
insurance plans.  The choice task was repeated once for each participant under the same 
experimental condition, but with different attribute values.  Under the informed ordering 
condition, alternatives were ordered almost perfectly in order from best to worse (according to 
the participants’ decision rule of minimizing expected costs).  The only deviation was that the 
first and third alternatives were switched.  The naïve ordering condition presented a randomized 
order of alternatives to participants with one exception, which was that the best alternative was 
placed in the fourth ranked position.  In the partitioned condition, respondents were shown the 
first three recommended products, with the easily visible option of clicking through to the 
complete list.  The non-partitioned condition showed the complete ordered list of all the 
recommended products directly to the participants (see Web Appendix A.1 for illustrations of the 
two partitioning conditions). 
Health insurance plans were described in terms of three key characteristics for the U.S. 
market—the monthly premium, the doctor visit copayment, and the annual deductible.  These 
were also successfully used in earlier research in this domain and market (Bhargava et al. 2017; 
Johnson et al. 2013).  The plans reflected a realistic product set in the participants’ health 
insurance market.  The participants were also given the relevant health care usage of the person 
for whom they were making the choice.  This information allowed them to calculate the annual 
expected costs of each of the health insurance products presented in the recommendation list. 
To obtain deeper insight into the participants’ decision process while selecting an 
alternative from the list, we implemented the experiment with a MouselabWEB online interface 
(Willemsen and Johnson 2011).  MouselabWEB allows researchers to trace the content and 
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sequence of decision processes.  The participants viewed a table in which each row represented a 
different health plan and each column displayed a different plan attribute.  This format 
corresponded with the how recommendation lists are typically presented to participants on health 
insurance exchange websites.  In the MouselabWEB interface, participants used their mouse to 
move the pointer on the screen across the different boxes in the table representing the different 
attributes of each alternative.  When the pointer hovers over a box, the level (value) of the 
respective attribute is revealed, and when the pointer is moved, the information is hidden.  This 
process reveals how often, for how long, and in which order participants examined the 
information about the attributes of each plan.  Past research suggests a close correlation between 
MouselabWEB observations and eye-tracking data, which can be an alternative way of tracing 
participants’ decision processes (Lohse and Johnson 1996; Reisen, Hoffrage, and Mast 2008).  
These data provide deep insight into the process behind the participants’ decision making.  We 
used the MouselabWEB data to investigate differences in participants’ decision processes 
depending on whether or not they were presented with different combinations of ordering and 
partitioning.  These differences can reveal if the hypothesized shifts in decision making process 
explain the effects of ordering and partitioning in improving consumer decision outcomes. 
The participants were recruited through Amazon MTurk using US participants.  We 
predetermined the sample size to be 200 per treatment condition, almost twice that used in a 
similar paradigm (Johnson et al. 2013).  The assignment to treatment conditions was randomized 
and the data collection was stopped after all the conditions contained at least 200 observations.  
A total of 846 responses were obtained, and 18 outliers were eliminated because they had made 
extraordinarily few (less than four) or many (more than 600) information acquisitions during the 
choice process.  The average age of the participants in the sample was 34.5 years old, 43.6% 
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were female, and 50.3% had obtained a bachelor’s or higher degree. 
The order of our description of the results maps into the hypotheses in Figure 1.  We first 
examine if the changes in choice architecture change the type of decision processing used by the 
participants (H1 to H3).  We then move to the right side of the figure to examine the effect of 
choice architecture on the choices made by respondents (H4).  We relate the two by testing for 
mediated moderation of the decision process on choice outcomes (H5). 
 
Results: Process Data 
First, we studied the process-level data obtained from the MouselabWEB interface.  This 
interface allowed us to directly observe which product attribute levels participants inspected 
during their decision process and in which order.  We find strong effects of the interventions on 
the decision processes, with partitioning changing decision strategy, and partitioning combined 
with informed ordering producing an increase in decision focus. 
We first present the data visually, in Figure 2, summarizing these data graphically in four 
icon graphs (Willemsen and Johnson 2011), each representing one of the four experimental 
conditions.  The icon graphs summarize participants’ information acquisition processes.  Each 
box corresponds to one of the cells in the displays shown to respondents.  For example, the top 
left box in the upper left panel represents the monthly premium of Plan A in the non-partitioned, 
naïve ordering condition.  The length of the box represents the average time participants spent 
inspecting a value (e.g., seven seconds) and the height represents the average number of times 
participants acquired that value (e.g., three times).  The length of the arrows between the boxes 
represents the number of transitions participants made in their information acquisition process 
(e.g., seven horizontal transitions from the monthly premium in plan A to the doctor visit copay 
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also in plan A).  The results are the means within each experimental condition for the two 
repeated choice tasks.  The inspection levels and large number of transitions show a significant 
amount of interest by the participants, who on average took 92.6 seconds to make each choice.  
Following standard practice, we eliminated all information acquisition observations of 200 ms or 
less, because they were too short to be seen by the participants and probably reflect movements 
of the pointer from one cell to the next (Willemsen and Johnson 2011). 
-  INSERT FIGURES 2, 3, AND 4 ABOUT HERE – 
The figure clearly shows the effects of partitioning and ordering on the decision 
processes, which can be observed by comparing the panels representing the different 
experimental conditions.  To conduct statistical tests of these effects, we constructed two process 
variables corresponding to the hypothesized processes based on the inspection data.  First, 
decision strategy was measured using the Payne (1976) index measure.  The Payne index (PI) 
captures whether a participant’s information acquisition process is more alternative-based or 
attribute-based.  Alternative-based information acquisition reflects a compensatory decision 
making process.  The PI takes the ratio of the difference between the number of alternative-based 
(horizontal) acquisition steps (NrALT) and the number of attribute-based acquisition steps 
(NrATT) and the sum of these two types of information acquisition steps, all from the 
MouselabWEB data (𝑃𝐼 = (𝑁𝑟𝐴𝐿𝑇 − 𝑁𝑟𝐴𝑇𝑇)/(𝑁𝑟𝐴𝐿𝑇 + 𝑁𝑟𝐴𝑇𝑇).  A score of 1 represents a 
completely alternative-based decision process (reflects a compensatory decision strategy), and a 
score of -1 represents a completely attribute-based search (reflects a non-compensatory decision 
strategy).  Second, decision focus was measured by the proportion of time spent inspecting the 
best  three alternatives (i.e., those with the lowest total cost in the defined utility task), relative to 
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total time looking at alternatives, with zero being no focus and 1 being total focus (in the 
mediation analysis, we take the natural log of this value). 
Figure 3 presents the average scores of the process variables by experimental condition.  
We ran analyses of variance to test for the significance of these results with partitioning, 
informed ordering, and their interaction as explanatory variables.  Panel A shows the Payne 
Index as our decision strategy measure.  As hypothesized, partitioning leads to an increased use 
of compensatory decision strategies, indicated by the relatively more positive means in the 
figure.  (H1; F(1, 1643) = 19.7, p < .001).  In addition there is a much smaller unpredicted effect, 
which is that informed ordering leads to a less compensatory decision process (F(1, 1643) = 4.5, 
p < .05).  Panel B shows the result for decision focus.  As hypothesized, we find that informed 
ordering strongly increases decision focus (H2; F(1, 1643) = 2390.6, p < .001).  Also as 
hypothesized, the interaction of partitioning and ordering was significant: partitioning leads to an 
increase in decision focus (i.e., a greater ratio of time spent inspecting the best three options) 
with informed ordering, but to a decrease in decision focus with naïve ordering (H3; F(1, 1643) = 
1062.7, p < .001). 
 
Results: Choice Outcomes 
Next, we investigated the hypothesized combined effect of ordering and partitioning on 
consumer choice (H4).  We analyzed (1) the probability that a participant selected the best 
alternative as a function of condition, and also the complementary dependent variable of (2) how 
much each participant overpaid as a result of selecting a suboptimal product in each condition.  
Both variables reflect deviations from the best insurance product specified by the decision rule 
communicated to the participants (Johnson et al. 2013).  Figure 4 (panel A) presents the accuracy 
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of choice, using the percentage of consumers choosing the best product under each condition (the 
upper bars in the figure) and the excess payment in dollars (the lower bars in the figure), both 
averaged over the two choices per participant.  Having an informed ordering positively impacts 
on both measures, while partitioning clearly interacts with the kind of ordering, helping with 
informed ordering and hurting with the naïve ordering.  A random effects logistic model for the 
choice of the best option confirmed these effects.  The model analyzed if the best option was 
chosen using the effects of ordering, partitioning, and their interaction.  The results support the 
hypothesized positive impact of partitioning with informed ordering, and that this impact 
reverses with naïve ordering.  A random effects regression model for the excess amount 
participants paid also showed a strong significant interaction of ordering and partitioning in the 
predicted direction (see Web Appendix B.1 for the detailed estimation results for both models). 
 
Results: Mediation Analysis 
Why do partitioning and informed ordering improve choices?   To test the hypothesized 
mediated moderation structure of decision strategy and decision focus on choice outcome (see 
Figure 1), we conducted analyses using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS module in SPSS.  We 
analyzed as our key dependent variable whether or not participants had made the best choice.  
Ordering (informed, naïve), partitioning (yes, no), and their interaction were the main 
independent variables.  The mediating process variables decision strategy (i.e., the Payne index) 
and decision focus (i.e., relative time spent on best options) were also included, as was the 
anticipated moderating effect of ordering on the effect of partitioning on decision focus.  In the 
model estimation, we used the data on the two observations per participant and included an order 
variable as a covariate.  The results of the analyses are presented in Table 1.  Following the 
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procedure outlined in Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010), the table first reports the unstandardized 
coefficients for the different pathways in the model.  These include the anticipated effects of 
ordering and partitioning on the mediating variables decision strategy and focus.  Consistent with 
our prior analysis, we find support for H1, H2 and H3, the effects of the manipulations on the 
hypothesized decision processes.  We also find support for the anticipated effects of the two 
decision processes on the dependent variable of choosing the best option. 
 Most importantly, the analysis allows us to look at the indirect effects of ordering and 
partitioning on the decision outcome, via the two parallel mediating decision processes.  In Table 
1, these results are shown in the bottom part with the 95% confidence intervals from the 
bootstrap analysis.  If these confidence intervals are significantly different from zero, there is 
support for the mediation hypothesis H5.  First, we concentrate on the mediation of the effects 
via of decision strategy.  The results show that decision strategy indeed serves as a mediator of 
the effect of partitioning on the choice of the best alternative (see the two rows for Indirect Effect 
of Decision Strategy; p<.05).  Next, we look at the mediation via decision focus.  We find 
decision focus is a significant mediator of the effect of partitioning on the dependent variable 
(see the two rows for Indirect Effect of Decision Focus; p<.05).  Finally, we find that the 
moderating effect of informed ordering on partitioning is also mediated by decision focus as 
hypothesized (see the row for Moderating Effect of Informed Ordering on Indirect Effect of 
Decision Focus; p<.05).  Jointly, these mediating effects provide strong support for H5.   
-  INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE – 
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 provide outcome- as well as process-level support for the 
hypothesized impact of ordering and partitioning on consumer choice in an incentive-compatible 
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decision-making setting with objectively defined different utility levels between the different 
choice outcomes.  In terms of decision outcomes, the results strongly support H4.  We find that 
informed ordering is beneficial for consumers and that partitioning is also beneficial when 
combined with informed ordering, but not when ordering is naïve.  In terms of decision process, 
the MouselabWEB data–based analysis allowed us to test H1 to H3 and H5.  The results 
supported our hypotheses and showed that the impact of ordering and partitioning on choice 
outcomes is mediated by participants’ use of a more compensatory decision making process 
(decision strategy) and their increased focus on the best alternatives (decision focus).  These 
findings show that partitioning combined with informed ordering based on a high-quality user 
model (e.g., ordering based on the product’s overall attractiveness to the consumer) constitutes a 
choice architecture ensemble that is beneficial for consumers.  However, with a naïve ordering 
(when user model quality is low), partitioning can harm consumers, particularly by shifting their 
attention to less attractive options in the set. 
Study 2: Field Study of a Health Insurance Choice Architecture Redesign 
 
Study 1 showed that partitioning and ordering can improve choice in a framed field 
experiment, but that does not ensure that similar results would occur in a real insurance 
marketplace.  In particular, we were concerned that actual buyers may not respond the same way 
in a real-world environment and that the results may be limited to the artificial MouselabWEB 
environment which is devoid of logos and may place restrictions on non-focal visual search.  
Finally, perhaps the effects of partitioning may disappear if consumers make consequential 
choices costing consumers significant money.  Therefore, in Study 2 we analyzed field data from 
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a leading financial product comparison website in the Netherlands.  The website is similar in 
many respects to HealthCare.gov in the United States and other health insurance exchange 
websites (Wong et al. 2016).  The firm serves as an intermediary between consumers and 
suppliers of health insurance.  Health insurance plans can be purchased directly through the 
website and many consumers go to the site each year to switch insurance providers.  The data we 
obtained comes from a quasi-experiment involving a major interface redesign. The firm 
introduced an informed ordering and partitioning intervention into their personalized health 
insurance recommendation lists.  By comparing consumer insurance choice data before and after 
the interface redesign, we can examine the impact of this particular ordering and partitioning 
intervention and see whether the results in a real-world environment are consistent with our 
outcome-oriented hypothesis H4 that informed ordering and partitioning improve consumer 
choice outcomes (Ericson and Starc 2012). 
 
Data 
Users of the website entered their personal characteristics and desired insurance 
specifications, including whether they would like additional coverage above the legal minimum.  
Based on this information, they were presented with an ordered list of recommended health 
insurance alternatives.  The original choice architecture was a full recommendation list of health 
insurance products that met each consumer’s prespecified criteria, ordered from low to high 
according to the premium (i.e., the plan’s purchase price) and displayed in groups of 10 to fit on 
a webpage.  After the redesign, the recommendation list was partitioned in two sections that 
reflected an improved user model that reflect both price and quality.  The first section presented 
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the top three most highly recommended products, ordered according to the model (see Web 
Appendix A.2 for before and after design).  The firm introduced the new price–quality ordering 
to more closely correspond to user preferences and better reflect consumer interests than the 
prior ordering based only on price.  In our terms, they improved their user model to produce a 
more informed ordering reflecting the fact that consumers must make tradeoffs between these 
attributes that are often negatively correlated.  The redesign also introduced a partitioning: 
Presenting a subset of the three plans highest ranked by the user model, but consumers could 
choose to click through to inspect the full list of 10 health insurance products.2  Thus, the 
redesign corresponded to a move from a non-partitioned, more naïve ordering, to a partitioned, 
more informed ordering. 
Consumers were able to purchase the insurance directly via the recommendation website 
for most products.  For a subset of products, they had to visit the insurer’s website to make the 
purchase.  In the latter case, we were not able to observe whether a policy was purchased with 
the insurance company or if they were only browsing.  Therefore, we only analyzed visits in 
which consumers made purchases directly through the recommendation website.  This allowed 
us to track the impact of changes in the website choice architecture on consumers’ actual market 
choices. 
We obtained data from November to December of two consecutive years, Year 1 (before 
the website choice architecture redesign) and from November to December of Year 2 (after the 
website choice architecture redesign).  Almost all health insurance purchases are made in the 
                                                 
2 The consumers could choose to sort this full list based on a product criterion that they selected, with price-based 
ordering being the default in the full list presentation.  As an intermediate step, the consumers were automatically 
shown the lowest price alternative if this was not already part of the top three price–quality ranking.  This step 
provided additional information in the recommended set to some consumers in the sample.  
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Netherlands during these two months, because this is the open enrollment period set by law.  In 
the data, health insurance products were purchased on the website during a total of 8,519 visits in 
Year 1 and during 35,113 visits in Year 2.  The website introduced a significant marketing 
campaign along with the redesign, likely attracting, along with the redesign, many more 
consumers to the website than before the change.  Because of privacy concerns, we were only 
able to obtain consumers’ age for the two years as sociodemographic background variables.  In 
Year 1, the average age was 36.2 years, and in Year 2 it was 39.1 years.  For both Year 1 and 
Year 2, the data we obtained captured the first 10 alternatives presented in the recommendation 
list.  Very few consumers chose outside of the first 10 alternatives and, hence, no other 
alternatives were stored by the website.  In Year 1, the data represented the full first page of 
recommended products, and in Year 2 the data covered the top three products first presented to 
consumers and the subsequent page that they could click through, with the first 10 alternatives.  
We also obtained the rank position of each alternative, as well as the user’s individual 
characteristics and insurance specifications and, finally, the alternative that was purchased. 
 
Results 
Figure 5 provides an overview of the results from the field study.  In Year 1 (no 
partitioning, price-only ordering), we found that 47.6% of the visitors who bought health 
insurance selected the first-ranked alternative.  In Year 2 (partitioning, price-quality based 
ordering), 60.8% of the visitors who bought health insurance selected the first-ranked alternative.  
More remarkably, the share of the lowest-ranked options in positions 4-10 declined from 31.2% 
to 12.8%, a decrease of 59% in relative market share, due, in part to the introduction of a soft 
partition with only one click added. 
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To test the impact of the introduction of the new choice architecture design on the rank of 
the products that the consumer purchased between the years, we estimated an ordered probit 
model.  The ordered probit is most appropriate for this analysis because it takes into account the 
fact that, although a higher-ranked position is superior to a lower-ranked one, we cannot observe 
the metric distance in attractiveness between the ranks.  It allows us to take into account the 
rank-order information from all consumers. The results of the ordered probit analysis strongly 
support the hypothesized positive combined effect of informed ordering and partitioning on 
consumer choice outcomes.  We find the new choice architecture design has a significant effect 
in the expected direction (β = .67, p < .001).  This effect shows that, after the introduction of the 
new choice architecture, consumers were significantly more likely to choose a higher-ranked 
alternative.  As a robustness check, we also estimated the ordered probit model while controlling 
for participants’ age.  The effect of this control variable was significant (β=-.01; p=0.001) 
indicating that overall, older consumers were less likely to choose a higher ranked alternative.  
Adding this control variable to the model did not affect the significance of the other results. 
-  INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE - 
Discussion 
The results of the field study provide real-world validation of the possible changes in 
choice that we predict when an informed order is combined with partitioning.  We found that 
consumers made different choices in the non-partitioned price-only based ordering setting 
compared to the new choice architecture design and the results of the ordered probit model 
estimates revealed a strong positive effect of introducing the new design.  Of course, this study is 
limited since there are a number of other factors that were not controlled when the intervention 
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occurred, such as the presence of different customers, new policies, and policy characteristics, a 
limitation we address with Study 3. 
Study 3: Experimentally Controlled Lab Replication of the Field Study 
 
Because the field data reflect real-world conditions, one potential confounding effect was 
the fact that the website likely attracted a broader, less expert, consumer segment to the 
redesigned website than before the change and it is unknown how that may have affected the 
decisions we observed.  Also, because the recommendations were personalized, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that differences in the composition of recommendation lists could also have 
affected the responses to the partitioned recommendations.  Therefore, in Study 3, we replicated 
the field study result in a simplified controlled online study that assigned respondents randomly 
to treatment conditions and presented the same set of alternatives to all respondents.  
 
Method 
The participants were randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions in a 2 
(ordering: informed vs. uninformed) x 2 (partitioning: yes vs. no) between-subjects experimental 
design.  In all conditions, participants were presented with a recommendation list of 10 health 
insurance plans (see Web Appendix A.3).  The plans were ordered on one of two measures of 
attractiveness: a more informed comprehensive measure that combined both price and quality 
based on the firm’s expert evaluations (ordered from the most to the least attractive price–quality 
score as was done in the field study), and a naïve ordering based on price only (ordered from the 
most to the least attractive price).  We also varied whether or not the set was partitioned: The 
partitioned condition showed participants the three most highly recommended products, with the 
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option to click through to the full list (ranked on the same ordering criterion).  The full 
recommendation list condition showed the ordered list of all recommended products directly to 
the participants without partitioning.  The products were described in terms of the key health 
insurance product features used on the health insurance comparison website from which we 
obtained our field data.  The participants could click on a help link to see a short explanation of 
each feature.  Although the presence of partitioning and the order of presentation varied, the 
participants had access to the exact same set of products and explanations under all conditions; 
therefore, any changes in observed choices must be due to the manipulated factors. 
The participants were asked to make a choice from the health insurance plans presented 
as if they had to select a health insurance plan for themselves.  The plans on the recommendation 
list closely reflected a realistic product selection in the participants’ health insurance market (the 
Netherlands) for adults.  The actual plans and price–quality ordering were taken from the website 
from which we obtained the field data for Study 2.  The brand names were changed to fictitious 
ones to avoid unobserved brand associations that the participants could have.  The only minor 
modifications made were to avoid the presence of clearly dominating alternatives in the list.  For 
this study, a total of 858 participants over the age of 18 were recruited through a large-scale 
online panel run by a marketing research company.  The average age of the participants was 46.7 
years old, 50.9% of them were female, 36.9% had a bachelor’s or higher degree, and 38.7% had 
bought health insurance for themselves or someone else in their household within the past two 
years. 
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Results 
To determine the significance of the observed differences in the ranks chosen between 
the conditions, we used an ordered probit model, as in the field study, to analyze the effects of a 
naïve ordering (based on price-only) versus an informed ordering ( based on price and quality), 
partitioning, and the interaction between these two factors  The results of the analysis strongly 
support the results of the field study.  We find that informed ordering and partitioning made 
consumers more likely to choose higher ranked options, with significant positive effects of 
informed ordering (β = .80, p < .001) and partitioning (β = 1.83, p < .001) as expected.  We find 
no significant interaction of informed ordering and partitioning (β = .12, p = .33).  As a 
robustness check, we also estimated the ordered probit model while controlling for the 
participants’ experience with buying health insurance in the past two years (yes/no).  The effect 
of this control variable was not significant, and adding it to the model did not affect the 
significance of the other results. 
 
Discussion 
The results of this study replicated that informed ordering and partitioning improve health 
care plan choices.  Unlike Study 2, which used a quasi-experimental design that limits inferences 
of causality, Study 3 demonstrated in a controlled experiment that informed ordering and 
partitioning cause improvements in choices between health care plans.  In contrast to Study 1, we 
do not find a significant interaction between ordering and partitioning.  This can perhaps be 
explained by the fact that a price-based ordering is still informative to consumers which may 
have attenuated the negative impact of the naïve ordering condition.  We investigate the effect of 
a partially informed ordering on consumer choice outcomes in Study 4.   
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Study 4: Partitioning Improves Consumer Choice Outcomes under 
Moderately Informed Ordering as Well 
 
Study 4 extends our work to a setting with a more realistic, partially informed ordering.  
This allows us to assess the impact of ordering and partitioning under more realistic conditions 
where the firm might have a moderately noisy ordering of options that would arise from an 
imperfect, but informative user model.  We used the same Dutch-language website as the basis 
for the experiment, introducing an additional third, moderately informed ordering.  As in Study 
1, the experiment employed a defined utility task that instructed participants which tradeoff to 
optimize in selecting an alternative from the set, but without incentives.  This again allowed us to 
define an objectively best option in the choice task. 
 
Method 
The participants were randomly assigned to one of the six treatment conditions of a 3 
(ordering: informed, partially informed, naïve) x 2 (partitioning: yes vs. no) between-subjects 
experimental design.  In all conditions, participants were presented with a list of the same 10 
health insurance plans.  The participants responded to a defined utility task in which they were 
asked to choose from the health insurance plans presented to them as if they were choosing a 
plan on behalf of a person they knew well but who was not part of their own household (e.g., an 
elderly aunt or uncle).  They were told that this person desired a minimum (well-defined) level of 
coverage and, otherwise, to choose the best buy.  The best buy was defined for them as the 
highest ratio of the monthly premium paid and the review ratings that customers gave the 
insurance provider.  Since they were based on the real-world website in Study 2, the plans reflect 
a realistic product set in the participants’ health insurance market (the Netherlands).  We 
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changed the brand names to be fictitious and participants could click on a help link to see a short 
explanation of each attribute.   
Under the informed ordering condition, alternatives were ordered to be almost perfectly 
aligned with the predefined decision criterion.  The only deviation was that the third and fourth 
alternatives in the ranking were reversed.  The partially informed ordering reversed the position 
of the first and third alternatives.  This condition examined if a top-three partitioning could help 
increase consumers’ ability to select the best alternative, even when the ordering was noisy.  The 
naïve ordering condition randomized the options, with two constraints: first, the third-ranked 
alternative was kept identical to that in the informed ordering condition, allowing us to more 
clearly compare the consumer choices between the three conditions.  Second, the most attractive 
alternative was fifth, so that the participants would have to search beyond the partitioning to find 
the best alternative in the list.   
We used two partitioning conditions, a non-partitioned condition and a partitioned 
condition presenting the first three recommended products with a prominent button allowing 
them to click through to the full list.  The full list condition showed the ordered set of all the 
recommended products directly to the participants.  This structure was the same as in Study 3 
(see Web Appendix A.3). 
Participants over the age of 18 were recruited through a large-scale online panel run by a 
marketing research company in the Netherlands.  A total of 1,577 valid responses were obtained. 
The average age of the participants in the sample was 45.5 years old, 51.1% of the, were female, 
42.2% had obtained a bachelor’s or higher degree, and 45.3% had bought health insurance for 
themselves or for someone else in their household in the past two years. 
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Results 
As in Study 1, we tested the effect of ordering and partitioning using as a dependent 
variable whether or not participants selected the objectively best product in each condition, and a 
second, complementary dependent variable, how much a participant overpaid compared to the 
best insurance product by selecting a suboptimal alternative.3  Both dependent measures show a 
similar pattern, seen in Figure 4, panel B.  The partially informed ordering is less effective than 
the fully informed ordering, but much closer to the informed than to the naïve ordering.  Most 
importantly, the effect of ordering interacts with partitioning:  Partitioning helps with informed 
or partially informed ordering but hurts for a naïve ordering.  Many participants selected the best 
alternative in the partially informed ordering condition (though fewer than in the informed 
condition) and partitioning helped with both fully informed and partially informed orders.  The 
figure shows that the informed and intermediate ordering clearly made a difference, with a naïve 
ordering producing worse performance in both outcome measures 
We tested this pattern using a logistic regression analysis that modeled the probability of 
participants’ selection of the best product, using the effects of ordering, partitioning, and their 
interaction.  The ordering was represented as an indicator variable, with naïve ordering being the 
base level.  Partitioning was also represented as an indicator variable, with non-partitioning as 
the base level.  The results confirm the impression given by the figure and our hypotheses.  We 
find a positive effect of informed ordering but not partial ordering in the non-partitioned 
condition (βINFORMED = .44, p = .01; βPARTIAL = .10, n.s.).  There is a negative effect of partitioning 
                                                 
3 We obtained this measure by first calculating the ratio of the monthly premium and the customer review rating for 
each product (in accordance with the participants’ task).  Using this ratio, we calculated a virtual yearly price for 
each consumers’ selected product at the consumer review score of the best available product.  The difference 
between this virtual price and the actual price for the best available product was the amount a consumer overpaid.   
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in the naïve ordering condition (βPARTITION = -2.67, p < .001), but this  is more than compensated 
for in the informed and partially informed conditions by the large and significant interaction 
effect (βINFORMED*PARTITION = 2.94, p < .001; βPARTIAL*PARTITION = 3.05, p < .001).  Jointly, these 
results provides strong support for H4, and show that in the partially informed condition there is 
also a positive effect of partitioning, in line with what we observed in Study 3.  We also ran an 
analysis controlling for participants’ experience with buying health insurance in the past two 
years (yes/no).  While prior experience helped (β = .24, p = .03), it did not affect the significance 
of the other results. 
Testing the amount overpaid showed a similar pattern of significance.  An analysis of 
variance looking at the three levels of ordering and the two partitioning levels and their 
interactions strongly support the hypothesized effects.  There is a strong significant effect of 
ordering in the predicted direction (F(2, 1571) = 69.7, p < .001), with lower losses in the case of 
higher user model quality.  We find an negative effect of partitioning (F(1, 1571) = 6.6, 
p  =   .01), which is compensated for by the hypothesized large interaction effect of ordering and 
partitioning (F(2, 1571) = 44.2; p < .001).  This interaction reflects the detrimental effect of 
partitioning in the naïve ordering condition, which, in the main effect, dominates the positive 
impact of ordering in the informed and partially informed conditions.  Additional analysis of the 
simple effects of partitioning within each ordering condition reveals the significance of these 
contrasting effects per condition and in the expected direction.  As hypothesized, we find that the 
impact of partitioning is significantly positive in the informed and partially informed ordering 
conditions (p = .03 and p = .02, respectively), but significantly negative in the naïve ordering 
condition (p < .001).  Again, we also conducted analysis of variance while controlling for 
participants’ experience with buying health insurance.  The effect of this control variable was not 
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significant and adding it to the model did not affect the significance of the other results. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Study 4 provide further support for the hypothesized moderating effect of 
ordering on the impact of partitioning on consumer choice outcomes in a normative setting with 
objectively different quality levels between different choice outcomes.  The outcome of our 
analyses strongly support the hypothesized effects of ordering and partitioning on consumer 
choice outcomes.  We find that, with informed and partially informed ordering, partitioning is 
beneficial for consumers, but with naïve ordering, partitioning is not beneficial and can even be 
harmful to consumer choice outcomes. 
General Discussion 
 
The results from all four studies show that as we hypothesized, ordering and partitioning 
have a significant and beneficial impact on consumer choice outcomes, but that these effects 
depend upon having a good user model.  Consumers are more likely to choose the best 
alternative when presented with a set that is ordered according to overall product attractiveness 
and partitioned into a small recommended set with the possibility of clicking through to see the 
full set.  We show that this is because the partition encourages the use of a compensatory 
decision strategy and when combined with an informed ordering, focuses consumer attention on 
a small set of high quality options.  
Since we are interested in improving the choice of health care policies, we can look at the 
performance of the incentivized decision-maker in Study 1.  In that study, consumers made 
mistakes in excess of $865 dollars when presented with the least effective choice architecture.  
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Having an informed order reduced that error to about $295, but adding a partition to that 
ordering reduced errors to just over $122, a savings of about $743 per decision-maker.  While 
these figures are specific to this study, they are similar to the size of errors reported in earlier 
framed-field experiments (Johnson et al. 2013) and field studies (Bhargava et al. 2017).  Given 
that there are slightly over 200 million people covered by private plans and 100 million by 
government plans, many of which involve choice, the stakes of getting the choice architecture 
right could be measured in billions, if not trillions of dollars in the U.S. alone. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
In addition to our proposition that decision focus and strategy selection are important 
mediators of choice architecture effects, we contribute two additional, broader theoretical 
considerations.  First, our research makes explicit a notion long implicit in the choice 
architecture literature: the idea of a user model.  If choice architects have a high-quality user 
model, they can intervene more effectively, since they can identify what is the correct option for 
each decision maker.  While we talk about this impact in terms of ordering and partition, it is 
also relevant in other choice architecture interventions such as defaults (Johnson and Goldstein 
2003).   
Second, our study suggests that the effects of choice architecture tools depend on the 
context and presence of other choice architecture tools.  In the present studies, partitioning and 
ordering did not simply have additive effects, but rather interactive effects.  In fact, partitioning 
had a positive impact on choices when options were ordered in an informed fashion, but a 
negative impact when options were naively ordered.  This suggests that choice architecture tools 
should be evaluated as ensembles and consumers could react differently to ensembles than to 
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each tool individually.  Contemporary websites often allow the user to employ multiple tools.  
Airline sites allow consumers to screen their options (e.g., by time, airline), a specific case of 
partitioning, and provide ordering options (e.g., by fare).  Our notion of ensembles suggests that, 
although each could usually be helpful, there are conditions under which they can lead to worse 
choice outcomes, particularly when one is applied with a poor implementation of the other.  
Obviously, both of these implications merit further inquiry. 
 
Future Research 
Ordering and partitioning, their interaction, and the idea of user models all raise 
important questions for future research and application.  Obviously, the idea of developing 
algorithms and models to make recommendations is a growing and vibrant area of consumer 
research (Chintagunta et al. 2016).  We hope that such models not only produce better quality 
predictions but are increasingly able to model the heterogeneity in consumer preferences.  Such 
heterogeneity in preferences has been a challenge for the use of choice architecture.  Defaults, 
for example, have usually been applied as a ‘one size fits all’ framework.  Yet it is possible to 
customize choice architecture, say through the use of customized ‘smart defaults’ to embrace 
such heterogeneity (Goldstein et al. 2008). 
An important question is how to improve decisions when user models make weak 
predictions.  One idea would be to adjust the characteristics of the presentation to reflect 
uncertainty in what people want.  Partitioning offers a good example.  If the firm is very certain 
of the quality of its user model, then the partitioned set can be quite small.  With greater 
uncertainty, the size of the partitioned set can increase until, at the extreme, there would be no 
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partitioning at all.  There is, therefore, no “one size fits all,” optimal partitioning size; rather, 
there are different optimal sizes for different markets and different firm modelling capabilities. 
 
Managerial and Policy Implications 
We close by discussing the tension we mentioned in the opening of the article, potentially 
between the interests of consumers and the profit-maximizing interests of firms.  We began by 
suggesting that there are situations where firms may know what is in the best interest of 
consumers and can prevent them from making mistakes.  We have examined one domain, 
namely health insurance, where that is arguably true.  Firms may have, for example, a more 
accurate idea of someone’s risks than the individual him- or herself because dangerous health 
events are both rare and potentially catastrophic.  We doubt that the average purchaser has an 
accurate view of the probability and cost of an auto accident or of contracting a serious disease 
when making a health insurance purchase. 
Firms may, in the short term, exploit these informational asymmetries, but the current 
work suggests another path, to build choice architectures that will help consumers make better 
decisions.  The success of this strategy may depend upon the ability of firms to convince people 
that there is value in following their recommendations, and this is likely to be a long-term 
proposition.  However, there are examples where firms have seemed to take this approach.  In 
investments, Betterment, a so-called robo-advisor, has prospered increasing assets under 
management to $16 billion dollars since its founding in 2010.  A major value proposition has 
been delivering a solution to “bad” behavior by consumers, for example improving their 
decisions by prioritizing the display of long-term returns to consumers and by explaining to them 
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why they should not sell in short term markets.  Other solutions are automated investment 
strategies, such as rebalancing portfolios automatically. 
 
Conclusion 
In close, it is worth noting that there are two factors that may affect our view of the 
marketing function in relation to choice architecture.  The first is the advent of a deeper 
understanding of the errors that can be made by consumers.  While some deviations from 
rationality may be defensible, others, such as paying too much for a dominated health insurance 
policy, or not investing properly for retirement, are harder to rationalize, and are probably 
significant mistakes that have negative financial and welfare effects.  The second is that given 
the advent of big data, firms may be better able to suggest choices that lead consumers to more 
satisfying outcomes than consumers themselves are.  Together, these factors suggest a marketing 
opportunity that is not apparent in models that posit a more rational, fully informed decision-
maker.  Choice architecture, wisely applied, can be a relatively inexpensive and efficient way to 
use this knowledge to improve social welfare.  Both better prediction of consumer choices and 
choice architecture could be used to increase short term profit.  For example, an insurer who 
observes their consumers paying too much for a dominated policy might be pleased with the 
increased revenue. However, we hope that firms use this knowledge to develop new business 
models that deliver longer term value to both consumers and their stockholders.  
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Table 1 
Study 1: Mediation Analysis for Best Choice§ 
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients of the Model Pathways Parameter 
estimate t-value 
Partitioning on Decision Strategy (H1) .04** 4.44 
Informed Ordering on Decision Strategy -.02** -2.13 
Interaction of Informed Ordering and Partitioning on Decision Strategy .01 .58 
Partitioning on Decision Focus -1.41** -24.94 
Informed Ordering on Decision Focus (H2) 1.82** 32.22 
Interaction of Informed Ordering and Partitioning on Decision Focus (H3) 1.66** 29.24 
Decision Strategy on Choice of Best Alternative .82** 4.96 
Decision Focus on Choice of Best Alternative .69** 7.70 
Partitioning on Choice of Best Alternative .02 .37 
Informed Ordering on Choice of Best Alternative -.14 -1.86 
Interaction of Informed Ordering and Partitioning on Choice of Best 
Alternative 
-.07 -1.11 
Bootstrap Tests of Indirect (Mediated Moderation) Effects (H5) Effect         S.E. 
Indirect Effect of Decision Strategy  (Naïve Ordering) .03* .01 
               5,000 bootstraps C.I. at 95% LL=   .01 UL=.06 
Indirect Effect of Decision Strategy  (Informed Ordering) .04* .01 
               5,000 bootstraps C.I. at 95% LL=   .02 UL=.07 
Indirect Effect of Decision Focus  (Naïve Ordering) -2.10* .20 
              5,000 bootstraps C.I. at 95% LL=-2.54 UL=-1.78 
Indirect Effect of Decision Focus  (Informed Ordering) .17* .02 
              5,000 bootstraps C.I. at 95% LL=   .13 UL=.21 
Moderating Effect of Informed Ordering on Indirect Effect of Decision 
Strategy  
.01 .02 
               5,000 Bootstraps C.I. at 95% LL=  -.02 UL=.04 
Moderating Effect of Informed Ordering on Indirect Effect of Decision 
Focus 
2.27* .21 
              5,000 bootstraps C.I. at 95% LL= 1.92 UL=2.73 
§ We also include a choice task order variable in the model that captures the average difference between the first and second sets of 
choices for each respondent.  For expositional clarity, this variable is not tabulated.  While the PROCESS module we used for 
estimation does not allow for random effects, we also ran the analysis for only the first choice for each participant and obtained 
similar findings. In this table, n = 828 (with two choice tasks observed for most but not all respondents).  The superscripts ** and *, 
respectively, denote significance at p < .01 and p < .05. 
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Figure 1  
Hypothesized Mediated Moderation Structure£ 
 
 
£ The moderating effect of informed ordering on the relationship between partitioning and decision focus is 
indicated by an arrow impacting the path from partitioning to decision focus.  Informed ordering results in 
a positive effect of partitioning on decision focus and choice of the best alternative.  However, naïve 
ordering reverses the effect of partitioning and leads to lower decision focus and lower decision quality.  
 
  
 
 
48 
 
Figure 2 
Study 1: Process Data MouselabWEB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
Figure 3 
Study 1: Decision Process Measures£ 
 
Panel A -  Decision strategy: 
Payne Index§   
 
 
 
Panel B – Decision focus: 
Ratio of time spent on best three options  
 
 
£  Lines in bars represent standard errors. 
§  For the Payne Index, higher (less negative) scores imply a more compensatory decision process. 
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Figure 4 
Percentage of Accurate Consumer Choices and  
Yearly Amount Overpaid Due to Not Choosing the Best Product£ 
 
Panel A - (Study 1)   
 
Panel B - (Study 4)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
£ Lines in bars represent standard errors. 
 
51 
 
Figure 5 
Field Study: Consumer Choices Before and After the Introduction of 
Informed Ordering and Partitioning 
 
 
 
 
 
